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Should the hand be visible or invisible? In these days of 
deregulation, many think the invisible hand of free 
market forces is preferable to the visible hand of 
government intervention. Thus the trucking, airline, 
and telecommunication industries have all been dereg-
ulated in recent years to foster the competition believed 
necessary for efficiency in the marketplace. Even the 
heavily regulated banking industry has also shared in 
this process. Under the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act (1980), the Federal 
Reserve must now competitively price its services— 
including check collection and clearing. In fact, some 
have argued recently that the Fed should relinquish its 
operating role in the payments system entirely; they 
maintain that the private sector is well equipped to 
provide these services. (See, for example, Reynolds 
1983.) 
At the turn of the century, however, the private bank-
ing sector was widely acknowledged to have produced 
an inefficient and counterproductive arrangement for 
collecting checks beyond the local level. The invisible 
hand wasn't working.
1 This failure to provide an ade-
quate solution for collecting out-of-town checks effi-
ciently was one reason that the Congress, as part of its 
banking reform measures developed between 1908 and 
1913, gave the Federal Reserve System both a regula-
tory role and an operating role in check clearing and 
collection. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the original 
decision to put the Fed into the check payments system: 
What was wrong with the check collection system 
before the Fed? What prevented the private banking 
sector from adequately addressing the problems? What 
did the reformers who framed the Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913 hope to achieve by giving the Fed an operating 
role in the check payments system? And how successful 
were the Fed's attempts to achieve its objectives during 
its early years? (The question of what the appropriate 
Fed role in the check payments system should be today 
is not dealt with here.) 
Our examination of documents from the period 
(roughly the 1850s through 1920s) leads us to conclude 
that some form of government intervention in the check 
payments system—the visible hand—was warranted at 
the time. But the Fed's involvement in the payments 
system was a limited success, for it failed to achieve its 
two main objectives: (1) creating a unified national 
check-clearing system in which all banks would partic-
ipate and (2) establishing a payments system where all 
*This paper is a substantially abridged version of the authors' Working 
Paper 309, "Federal Reserve Involvement in the Check Payments System: 
Origins, Intent, and Results" (Duprey and Nelson, forthcoming). Readers inter-
ested in the fuller version can obtain a copy on request to the Research 
Department. 
^Formerly Senior Economist, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis. 
'Some might argue that free market forces had been stymied from the start 
by the hand of government through prohibitions against branch banking. This 
resulted in the creation of tens of thousands of independent unit banks, which 
contributed to the problem. 
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banks remitted payment for their checks at face value. 
We conclude that although the Fed came close to meet-
ing its objective of universal par payment, it failed in its 
objective to establish a unified national clearing system, 
largely because it underestimated the stiff opposition 
and competition that would come from the correspon-
dent banking system. Still, the Fed deserves credit for 
initiating a national clearing system. 
The Check Payments System Before the Fed: 
1850-1913 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, 
demand deposits (checking accounts) began to replace 
currency (coin and paper notes) as the most popular 
means of making payments. The use of checks required 
that funds be transferred between banks. Thus, as the 
volume of checks to be collected grew rapidly, the 
banking industry was challenged by the problem of 
effectively dealing with this burgeoning volume. The 
collection of local checks was a fairly straightforward 
process, but the collection of out-of-town (or inter-
community) checks proved a difficult problem for the 
banking system. 
Local Check Collection 
Local check collection before the 1850s mainly con-
sisted of bilateral collection arrangements among a 
community's banks (see Chart 1). In New York City, 
for example, each bank would daily send an agent to 
present for payment checks drawn on half of the local 
banks and to receive checks drawn on the agent's bank. 
Each bank would record the face (par) value of the 
checks exchanged. At the end of the week, the banks 
would settle the net balances, if any, due to or from the 
other banks and send the agent out to pay or receive the 
difference. 
This setup worked fairly well when only a few banks 
were involved. But in a major financial center like New 
York City, which by 1853 boasted 52 banks, bilateral 
collection arrangements proved cumbersome. Bank 
agents were hard pressed to visit 26 banks each day, 
and each bank had to record up to 51 daily accounting 
transactions. 
To streamline the collection process, the country's 
first local clearinghouse was introduced in New York 
City in 1853. This was a centralized meeting place for 
collecting and clearing checks.
2 Each day, member 
banks, who shared the clearinghouse's operating ex-
penses, sent their agents to the clearinghouse to present 
checks drawn on other member banks to the manager. 
The checks were quickly sorted by bank, their full 
Charts 1 and 2 
Bilateral Collection Compared With the Clearinghouse 
Chart 1 A Bilateral Collection Arrangement Among Four Banks 
Note: Total transactions = (n
2 — n)l2, where n = number of banks. 
Chart 2 A Clearinghouse Arrangement Among Four Banks 
Note: Total transactions = n, where n = number of banks. 
amounts entered in the clearinghouse ledger, and the 
checks themselves returned to the agent of the bank on 
which they were drawn. Then the debits and credits 
were totalled and a single net balance for each bank 
was either paid to or collected from the clearinghouse 
(see Chart 2). 
2 
The distinction between check collection and check clearing needs to be 
clarified. The collection of checks refers to the presentment of checks at the 
banks on which they were drawn and the remittance (payment) for these 
checks. The clearing of checks refers to the offsetting of claims for payment 
among a group of banks to determine a single net balance for each bank; the net 
balance is then due to or from a central clearing agent representing all group 
members. 
19 The efficiency of the clearinghouse arrangement 
was readily apparent (compare Charts 1 and 2). It 
reduced the number of check exchanges and settle-
ments, the amount of bookkeeping, and the cost and 
risk of transporting currency between banks. Not sur-
prisingly, New York City's clearinghouse system caught 
on rapidly: similar local clearinghouses sprouted in 
other cities, and by 1913 their number had expanded 
nationally to 162. 
Intercommunity Check Collection 
At the intercommunity level, virtually all collecting of 
out-of-town checks was handled through bilateral ar-
rangements between banks. Although some banks 
simply mailed checks directly to the banks on which 
they were drawn, most relayed checks through an 
intermediary, or correspondent. 
An elaborate system of correspondent bank relation-
ships had developed to provide banks with a number of 
mutually beneficial services. Typically, one of the cor-
respondents in a relationship was a city bank. Usually 
located in major financial centers, city banks sought 
deposits from other banks in order to increase their 
lending power and to earn more revenues and profits 
from loans. To attract deposits from other banks, city 
banks paid interest (about 2 percent) on interbank 
demand deposits and provided a number of services, 
including investment advice, credit ratings, and check 
collection. The other correspondent was typically a 
country bank. Usually smaller institutions that were 
located outside financial centers, country banks main-
tained deposits at city banks to meet legal reserve 
requirements, to have an account for making inter-
community payments by bank draft, to earn interest on 
deposits, and to obtain city bank services—primarily 
check collection.
3 
The existing intercommunity check collection sys-
tem was criticized by its contemporaries for a number 
of defects, including the practice of not paying the par 
value of checks sent for remittance (nonpar payment) 
and practices that contributed to inefficiency. 
• Nonpar Payment 
One practice criticized by some bankers and defended 
by others was that of nonpar payment by imposing 
remittance charges on checks sent to banks for payment. 
These charges, typically a percentage of the amount of 
the check returned, were most often made by country 
banks on their own checks mailed to them for payment 
from out-of-town. Geographic isolation made it easier 
for many of these banks to engage in the practice. 
An example may clarify what this practice entailed. 
Say that a city bank's customer deposits an out-of-town 
check for $1000. The city bank credits the customer's 
account for the full value of the check and then mails 
the check to the check writer's bank for collection. But 
the check writer's bank imposes a remittance charge, 
returning only $999 to the city bank. Not wishing to 
irritate its customer, the city bank decides to absorb the 
cost of the remittance charge. Or, not wishing to absorb 
the cost, it deducts a $1 collection fee from its cus-
tomer's account. The country bank's practice of impos-
ing a remittance charge has cost either the city bank or 
its customer $1. 
Customary banking practices at the time dictated 
that a check presented at the counter of the bank on 
which it was drawn must be paid at par; however, if a 
check arrived by mail, that bank could impose a remit-
tance charge in paying the check. For many country 
banks, remittance charges were a significant source of 
revenue: some bankers estimated that these charges 
provided as much as 20 to 50 percent of net earnings of 
the average country bank (U.S. Congress 1913b, pp. 
198,2252). 
Critics of remittance charges, often city banks, found 
the practice to be unfair and inappropriate. Remittance 
charges of up to $3 per $1,000—not uncommon at the 
time—were regarded as excessive in relation to the 
actual costs banks incurred in remitting payment for 
checks. Critics also noted that the charges were often 
applied haphazardly and at quite arbitrary rates. Banks 
that imposed remittance charges (nonpar banks) were 
seen as taking unfair advantage of banks that remitted 
at par. Furthermore, some critics argued that remit-
tance charges made the wrong party bear the cost—the 
check depositor rather than the check writer. 
• Inefficiency and Delays 
One source of inefficiency in the existing system for 
collecting out-of-town checks was the nonpar payment 
practice just discussed. Critics of the day particularly 
faulted one outcome of this practice: the circuitous rout-
ing of checks. Often the roundabout process was the 
result of efforts to avoid remittance charges by finding a 
correspondent that had an agreement to collect checks 
at par from the check writer's bank. Out-of-town 
checks could proceed through a chain of a dozen differ-
ent correspondent banks before finally reaching the 
Correspondent relationships were not exclusively those between city and 
country banks. City banks established and maintained relationships with other 
city banks for many of the same reasons that country banks did. 
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bank on which it was drawn. In a number of reported 
instances, checks meandered for hundreds of miles and 
several weeks to a final destination relatively near the 
sending bank. 
Critics of the day also noted that even when checks 
were being sent to destinations via fairly direct routes, 
there was much unnecessary duplication of facilities 
and efforts. By failing to consolidate or "bunch" paral-
lel sendings, banks wasted labor, postage, and other 
resources. 
Delays in remittance resulted not only from circui-
tous routing but also from the remitting bank's failure to 
pay promptly once it had received a check. Country 
banks often deliberately slowed payment in order to 
keep funds as long as possible. The effect of slowed 
remittance was simply a transfer of income—that is, 
increased costs to city banks in the form of lost interest 
on uncollected funds exactly offset by gains to country 
banks from the use of the funds. But delays in remit-
tance also increased the risk that a check writer's bank 
might become insolvent before making payment, and 
this enlarged risk was borne by collecting banks and 
their depositors. 
Private Remedies: 1890-1907 
That the existing system for collecting intercommunity 
checks had problems was readily apparent to members 
of the banking community. Less apparent, however, 
was how to remedy the problems. Activity by bankers 
to tackle check collection problems intensified in the 
1890s, a time when bank earnings were subject to 
unusual pressures. At that time, the growth of individual 
checking accounts was accelerating at a much higher 
rate than in previous decades, partly since personal 
checks were becoming more widely used in out-of-
town transactions. The volume of out-of-town checks 
processed for collection by city banks had reached the 
point where check collection dominated city bank 
operations. 
Among the private banking sector's efforts to remedy 
the problems, two main approaches can be distin-
guished, both sponsored by city clearinghouse organi-
zations. One approach attempted to offset the high 
costs of intercommunity check collection by imposing 
standardized collection fees to be paid by depositors of 
out-of-town checks. The other attempted to reduce the 
costs of intercommunity collections by extending the 
local clearinghouse technology to the regional level. 
These two approaches tended to have opposite effects 
on the personal check as a payments medium. The one 
discouraged use of the personal check for out-of-town 
payments because it increased collection costs; the 
other encouraged its use by improving its acceptability. 
To a great extent, conflicting interests within the private 
banking sector ultimately prevented it from imple-
menting efficient solutions to the problems of inter-
community check collection. 
Standardizing Collection Fees 
One response by city bankers to relieve cost pressures 
from the growing volume of out-of-town-checks was to 
impose standardized collection fees for depositing such 
checks. By doing so, the bankers hoped to achieve two 
ends: first, to offset the cost of country banks' remit-
tance charges with collection fees; second, to eliminate 
city banks' competitive practice of absorbing remit-
tance charges as a way of offering "free" check collec-
tion privileges to attract customers. 
The local clearinghouse organization provided the 
means by which standardized fees could be imposed 
and enforced. A standard schedule of fees was adopted, 
detailed in the clearinghouse bylaws, and signed by all 
member banks. Generally, the rules divided the country 
into zones with specified fees for checks from each 
zone. The immediately surrounding trade area and a 
few related financial centers were set up as a discre-
tionary zone within which checks could be collected 
without charge or at an independently determined rate. 
Arrangements of this sort sprang up in the mid-
1890s, including ones by clearinghouses in St. Louis, 
Kansas City, Omaha, Baltimore, Houston, and Denver. 
But the most significant of these arrangements occurred 
in 1899, when New York City's clearinghouse adopted 
standardized collection fees. These arrangements re-
sulted in the loss of some correspondent bank cus-
tomers, who could no longer receive par credit for 
out-of-town checks deposited in their accounts. In addi-
tion, city merchants who primarily received out-of-
town checks as payment were particularly unhappy 
about being charged for checks they deposited. 
Also in 1899, a conference of clearinghouses met to 
discuss the possibility of coordinating collection charges 
on out-of-town checks throughout the country. To 
study this matter further, the Clearinghouse Section of 
the American Bankers Association (ABA) was eventu-
ally formed in 1906 and continued to meet annually, 
but their attempts to promote standardized charges 
nationwide failed to gain wide acceptance. 
Although a national system of standardized collec-
tion fees might have eliminated much of the circuitous 
routing of checks that resulted from attempts to avoid 
remittance charges, proposals for such a plan failed to 
21 gain acceptance by other major city clearinghouses. 
Furthermore, the proposals tended to reinforce nonpar 
payment practices and to favor the system of bilateral 
collection arrangements (either by direct mail or through 
correspondent networks), with its multiple sendings of 
bundles of checks and remittances and with its multiple 
interbank balances. 
Extending the Clearinghouse Technology 
The other principal action taken by city clearinghouses 
to remedy the problems of intercommunity check col-
lection was to extend the local clearinghouse technol-
ogy to the regional level. Proposals had even been made 
for linking regional clearing systems into a national 
one. To some bankers, extending the clearinghouse 
idea beyond the local level seemed the next logical step 
in the evolution of the payments system. Under such a 
development, the personal checking account would 
perform even better as a form of circulating currency 
superior to bank notes and other paper money. Theoret-
ically, this development seemed desirable in the name 
of technological progress. 
The bankers who proposed regional clearing ar-
rangements were, of course, motivated less by theoreti-
cal ideals than by more immediate and practical needs. 
As remittance charges, handling costs, and collection 
delays increasingly cut into their earnings, city bankers 
began to consider the economies of extending local 
clearinghouse arrangements to out-of-town check col-
lection. During the 1880s and 1890s, bankers ad-
dressed at local, state, and national meetings the prob-
lems posed by intercommunity checks. ABA meetings 
and national banking journals provided a forum for 
discussing a nationwide organization for regional clear-
ing. Many proposals emerged from these discussions, 
though few concrete results. 
In 1899, however, the first significant regional clear-
inghouse operation in the country was established by 
Boston's clearinghouse association to cover most New 
England banks. (Proposals for such an arrangement 
had been studied by the association as early as 1877.) 
Although Boston's plan achieved great economies, it 
fell short of the ideal of a unified par clearing system for 
several reasons.
4 Ideally, all banks within the region 
would have participated and all nonlocal checks would 
have been sent to and received from a single clearing 
center. But as a concession to existing correspondent 
banking interests, Boston's system retained some fea-
tures of the prior correspondent collection network. In 
practice, clearinghouse members continued to collect 
checks directly from their own country correspondents 
while bringing other out-of-town checks to the regional 
clearinghouse, where they were sorted and sent to their 
respective country banks. Moreover, Boston's regional 
clearinghouse collected only from, not for, the region's 
country banks. And finally, not all out-of-town checks 
were remitted for payment at par, for over 10 percent of 
the country banks refused to forego their remittance 
charge practices. 
The Boston plan's success in implementing the 
nation's first regional par clearing system, partial 
though it was, provoked interest among other cities 
throughout the country. In 1905, Kansas City's clear-
inghouse introduced a roughly similar plan, though 
without any par remittance requirement. By 1912, 
about a dozen regional clearinghouses had been es-
tablished. 
Despite the fact that none of these regional arrange-
ments achieved a complete and unified clearing plan, 
considerable savings in the costs of check collection 
were reported. For example, before its regional system 
was implemented, Boston's 31 clearinghouse members 
mailed about 7,000 daily collection letters to 625 New 
England country banks. After the regional clearing-
house was established, the member banks' mailings 
were substantially consolidated. The clearinghouse 
daily sent each of the 625 New England country banks 
a single collection letter containing all checks drawn on 
each except those received by their Boston correspon-
dents. Each Boston correspondent also sent separate 
collection letters to its own country correspondents. In 
all, the number of daily collection letters sent from 
Boston to New England country banks totalled under 
1,300—about a fifth of the number sent before the 
regional clearinghouse was established. Instead of re-
mitting checks on a weekly or biweekly basis, the coun-
try banks made daily remittances of a single payment to 
the Boston clearinghouse. These economies encour-
aged the acceptability of country bank checks in New 
England. From a national perspective, however, the 
regional clearinghouse movement made only limited 
headway, even though the evidence indicated such a 
system was capable of great economies. 
Why the Private Sector Failed 
Why was the private banking sector unable to correct 
the recognized deficiencies in its handling of out-of-
4 
We base our notion of what constitutes an ideal regional system largely on 
the London clearinghouse system implemented for banks throughout England 
and Wales in 1858. For a description of that system, see Duprey and Nelson, 
forthcoming. 
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town check collection? The answer seems to be that 
many bankers did not perceive participation in a uni-
versal par clearing arrangement to be in their best 
interests. Conflicting interests among various segments 
of the banking community—city versus country banks, 
city banks versus city competitors, and New York City 
versus other financial centers—hindered the coopera-
tion required to implement a complete system of 
regional and interregional clearings. These conflicting 
interests centered largely around three issues. 
The first was the issue of par payment. Because 
many country banks derived a substantial portion of 
their income from remittance charges, they vigorously 
opposed the loss of part or all of this income. And their 
opposition to par payment represented one of the barri-
ers to establishing unified regional clearing. Although 
par payment wasn't an inevitable part of regional clear-
ing, it was integral to some previously established 
regional clearinghouses and was a possible outcome of 
any new clearing arrangement. Moreover, country 
banks felt they might be the underdogs in a regional 
clearing system dominated by large city banks—banks 
that generally stood to gain by the elimination of remit-
tance charges. 
The second issue involved competition among cor-
respondent banking centers for country bank deposits. 
A system of regional clearing was likely to cause 
reshuffling of correspondent bank balances within 
financial centers as well as between them. Many finan-
cial center bankers, fearing that their correspondent 
accounts would shift away, were unreceptive to the 
organization of regional clearing systems. For example, 
a 1906 banker's address (Berger 1906, pp. 94-95) cites 
the likely loss to New York City of correspondent 
accounts held in Albany, Baltimore, and Philadelphia 
as a reason for the three cities to oppose the establish-
ment of regional par clearing systems across the 
country. 
The third issue was that of opposition to the use of 
personal checks for intercommunity payments—oppo-
sition mainly on the part of some financial center 
bankers, particularly those in New York City. Many 
city bankers condemned the use of personal checks for 
out-of-town payments because of the high costs of 
labor, postage, and other resources required for collec-
tion. Many of them preferred to see the traditional bank 
draft used as a means of intercommunity payment 
because it made fewer inroads on their profits. Since 
regional clearinghouses would have the effect of encour-
aging the use of personal checks, some key city bankers 
were unsympathetic to the introduction of regional 
clearinghouses. 
Because of these conflicting interests within the 
banking community, many observers at the time were 
pessimistic about the prospects for the private sector's 
success in solving the problems of inefficient collection 
and nonpar payment. It seemed highly unlikely that 
established banking interests would voluntarily sur-
render their traditional correspondent relations 
(Wexler; quoted in U.S. Congress 1913a, p. 615). 
Although Boston's regional clearing plan, incomplete 
though it was, might eventually have caught on more 
widely, winning national support for an integrated sys-
tem of regional clearing would have been a "very slow 
process" (Preston 1920, p. 568). For these reasons we 
think that a unified national clearing system with uni-
versal par payment would have been unlikely to 
develop without government intervention. 
The Government Gets Involved: 1908-1913 
The possibility that the government might become 
involved in reforming the check payments system was 
not totally unexpected. Some bankers were beginning 
to think government intervention might be required to 
break the logjam of private banking interests that pre-
vented the extension of the clearinghouse technology to 
the national level.
5 
The immediate impetus for government action in 
banking reform was the Banking Panic of 1907. 
Although reform centered on the issue of preventing 
future panics (by concentrating reserves in more central 
locations, channeling reserves to banks in need, and 
creating an elastic currency), a peripheral concern was 
the private banking sector's failure to develop an effi-
cient national clearing mechanism for intercommunity 
checks. 
The National Monetary Commission: 1908-1912 
Created by the Congress in 1908 to study ways of 
reforming the banking system, the National Monetary 
Commission, reporting in 1912, recommended the 
formation of a National Reserve Association (NRA). 
The NRA would consist of 15 branch banks and a board 
of directors from the banking community. The associa-
tion's main functions would be to consolidate voluntar-
ily contributed reserve deposits, to discount (buy) the 
commercial paper of members in need, and to provide 
For instance, the Philadelphia banker W. T. Berger (1906, p. 95) con-
cluded that "it may be necessary to bring all banks of deposit under Federal 
control before the desired result can be brought about." 
23 an elastic currency. The commission's study (U.S. Con-
gress 1912, pp. 7-8) also found the current payments 
system to be defective: "We have no effective agency 
covering the entire country which affords necessary 
facilities for making domestic exchanges between dif-
ferent localities and sections, or which can prevent 
disastrous disruption of all such exchanges in times of 
serious trouble." 
To remedy problems in the payments system, the 
commission recommended that the NRA be required to 
transfer member bank balances between accounts at 
the same branch or different branches; that local asso-
ciations of NRA members be permitted to form and 
operate clearinghouses; and that the NRA be em-
powered to require local associations to perform clear-
ing services to facilitate payments between regions 
when the public interest needed these services. It should 
be noted that none of the commission's recommenda-
tions for payments system reform required par clearing, 
nor did they authorize the main NRA branches to 
engage in clearing operations, leaving clearing to the 
local associations instead. So the commission's 
recommendations could hardly be said to add up to a 
national clearing system.
6 
The commission's recommendations were embod-
ied in a bill presented to the Congress in 1912 by 
Senator Aldrich, a prominent Republican who chaired 
the commission. But by then the Democrats controlled 
the House, and Woodrow Wilson's Democratic admin-
istration was soon to be elected. Not surprisingly, the 
commission's recommendations were never enacted. 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 
The Federal Reserve Act was the result of efforts begun 
in 1912 by a subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency. The subcommittee's work pro-
gressed to the point that Carter Glass, who chaired the 
subcommittee, and H. Parker Willis, who served as an 
adviser, were able to present a specific proposal to 
President-Elect Wilson by December 1912. Reworked 
during the next months in response to suggestions from 
President Wilson, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, 
and Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency 
Committee Owen, the bill was finally passed by the 
Congress in December 1913. 
The central ideas of the Federal Reserve Act shared 
some key features of the National Monetary Commis-
sion's proposals but differed in several ways. Rather 
than being branches of a single organization, the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks were semi-independent—a form of 
decentralization the Democrats preferred. Rather than 
being selected by the banking community, the Federal 
Reserve Board was government appointed, thereby 
alleviating suspicions that big bankers would dominate 
the new organization. More important, the act stipu-
lated that bank reserves for meeting legal reserve 
requirements had to be kept in the form of vault cash 
and balances at Fed Banks rather than balances at 
correspondent banks in reserve cities. Banks were given 
three years to comply with this new reserve require-
ment, which was considered essential to give the Fed 
enough resources to effectively prevent panics and 
financial disorders. 
The act's provisions for check collection went sev-
eral steps beyond the National Monetary Commis-
sion's. Par clearing of checks was explicitly mentioned; 
check clearing at Fed Banks (not just local associations 
of member banks) was authorized; and member bank 
charges were to be regulated. Basically, the act made 
the following provisions: 
• It required Federal Reserve Banks to receive from 
members, at par value, all checks and drafts drawn 
on other members. 
• It permitted the Federal Reserve Board to require 
Fed Banks to serve as clearinghouses for their 
members. 
• It required the Board to fix the fee that Fed Banks 
might impose for clearing services provided. 
• It required the Board to establish regulations 
governing the transfer of funds among Fed Banks 
and the charges to be made for such transfers. 
• It permitted the Board to either act as a clearing-
house for Fed Banks or designate a Fed Bank to 
do so. 
• It required the Board to fix by rule the charges to be 
collected by member banks from customers whose 
checks were cleared through Fed Banks. 
Note that these provisions did not, however, require 
check clearing operations but only permitted them. 
Moreover, they made no specific authorizations about 
how the Fed should handle nonmembers' checks. 
One consultant to the commission's report, the Harvard specialist on 
Banking and Currency O. M. W. Sprague (1911, pp. 834-39), saw larger 
potential for NRA involvement in the payments system. Sprague argued that 
the NRA could become an efficient national clearinghouse by using its 
branches as links between local clearing associations. In addition, he thought 
the NRA could exert pressure on member banks to remit all checks at par. 
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From these provisions—and from the writings of the 
principal framers of the act (see, for example, Glass 
1913, Willis 1914, and Owen 1914)—two key objec-
tives for the Federal Reserve's check collection system 
are evident: 
• The establishment of a national clearinghouse sys-
tem in which all banks would participate. 
• A check collection system in which all checks 
would be collected at par value. 
These two objectives were the cornerstones of a univer-
sal par clearing system for the nation—a goal that the 
evidence indicates the framers of the act envisioned. 
Two Roles: Operating and Regulatory 
The framers of the Federal Reserve Act hoped to 
achieve their two key objectives by giving the Fed both 
an operating and a regulatory role in the payments 
system. The operating role permitted each Fed Bank to 
serve as a central clearinghouse for its members. Within 
a district, a member would send directly to its Fed Bank 
all out-of-town checks drawn on other members. The 
Fed Bank would immediately credit the member's 
reserve account for the checks' par value and imme-
diately debit the accounts of banks on which the checks 
were drawn. 
Two features of the envisioned clearing system are 
noteworthy. First, the practice of giving immediate 
credit was seen as a way to attract members to use the 
Fed's clearing service, since members were not strictly 
required to do so. Immediate credit would be particu-
larly attractive to city banks, which frequently did not 
receive credit for out-of-town checks until after consid-
erable delay. (Country banks, in contrast, would have 
their Fed accounts immediately debited before the 
cleared checks could even be returned to them for 
inspection; as a result, they did not find this feature so 
attractive.) The second feature for attracting members 
was par credit—that is, giving members the benefit of 
receiving full value for checks deposited in their 
accounts. Together, these two features were designed to 
attract a large flow of checks into the Fed system and 
draw state banks into membership. 
Although the act authorized arrangements for the 
Fed to apply its clearing function on an interdistrict 
basis, the details for accomplishing this were left for 
later. Left undetermined were the specifics of how to 
route out-of-town checks between Federal Reserve 
Districts, whether or not to give immediate credit for 
interdistrict checks, and how to settle interdistrict bal-
ances among Fed Banks. 
The Fed's regulatory role allowed the Federal 
Reserve Board to fix the collection charges that member 
banks could impose on customers for depositing or 
writing checks cleared by the Fed. The Board was also 
allowed to set the Fed's service fees to cover the operat-
ing expenses of check clearing. 
Benefits of Fed Involvement 
By involving the Fed in check clearing and in regula-
tion, the framers of the act hoped the new payments 
system would correct the deficiencies of the prior check 
payments system, principally by improving the effi-
ciency of check collection through a unified national 
clearing system and by eliminating nonpar payment 
abuses. But they also had a political agenda of strength-
ening the Fed's institutional role and effectiveness. 
• Unified National Clearing 
By establishing a single, unified clearing system for the 
nation, the Fed's framers intended to make the collec-
tion of out-of-town checks more efficient than under 
the prior system. Deposited checks would be sent to the 
Fed and routed as directly as possible to the banks on 
which they were drawn. Thus the number of interme-
diaries that a check passed through would be mini-
mized. By dealing with a single agency rather than 
several, members would reduce the number of check 
shipments, accounting transactions, and settlement 
payments required. And since settlement would be 
handled by bookkeeping entries at Fed Banks, inter-
bank payment via bank draft would be eliminated. In 
short, the amount of check handling, clerical work, and 
mailing expense would be substantially reduced for 
member banks. 
By routing checks more directly to their final desti-
nations, the Fed's clearing system would also reduce the 
time required to collect checks. This increased timeli-
ness in collection would be an advantage for banks and 
businesses, enabling them quicker access to funds de-
posited as checks. Moreover, quicker collection time 
would reduce the risk to the check depositor of having a 
check bounce or the risk to the collecting bank of 
having a check depositor spend funds before they were 
sure of being collected. 
• Universal Par Payment 
By establishing a system with universal par payment, 
the Fed's clearing system was intended to eliminate 
remittance charges. Although city banks would gain 
from par payment, country banks would stand to lose 
money by no longer being able to impose remittance 
fees. Even though country banks might recover some of 
25 their losses by charging customers a service or collec-
tion fee for writing out-of-town checks, the Fed's 
designers hoped that competition and regulation would 
keep these charges to a minimum. They also hoped that 
the benefits of eliminating remittance charges (plus 
those obtained from greater efficiency) would be 
passed along to the public via lower collection charges, 
primarily at city banks. 
• An Advanced Payments System 
Par payment, lower collection charges, and speedier 
collection would all make the personal check a more 
advanced, convenient, and acceptable means of pay-
ment for intercommunity transactions—a desirable 
goal, according to the framers of the Federal Reserve 
Act. They felt the Fed's involvement would speed the 
evolution of the payments system further away from 
currency toward demand deposits. Such a shift was seen 
as a benefit to the public, since paper currency was 
considered a higher-cost medium than the demand 
deposit. 
• A Stronger Central Bank 
The framers of the Federal Reserve Act also justified 
the Fed's involvement in the payments system because 
they hoped to benefit the Federal Reserve in another 
way—by making the Federal Reserve System a 
stronger institution so that it could meet its main objec-
tive of preventing future bank panics. They felt the Fed 
would be stronger if given a highly visible role in the 
day-to-day operations of the financial system. Without 
their clearing function, Fed Banks "would become 
merely the holders of dead balances carried for the 
member banks without any service to them; and, since 
the business public abhors an idle or unnecessary insti-
tution ... it would not submit long to the needless 
burden created by such emergency institutions de-
signed to 'put out financial fire' " (Willis 1926, p. vi). 
Since the Fed Banks were the retainers of banks' 
legal reserves, the clearing function was important 
because it allowed reserves to perform double duty-
meeting legal reserve requirements while serving as 
clearing balances. The framers of the act also felt that 
providing collection and clearing services would be a 
way to draw more members—larger membership being 
the means to strengthen the institution as well. 
Problems of Implementation: 1914-1923 
In November 1914, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks 
of the Federal Reserve System began operation. During 
the next decade the Fed's efforts to establish a national 
par clearing system shifted gears several times as prob-
lems and resistance were encountered. Although the 
efforts to develop a national clearing system were 
partly successful, they ultimately failed to meet the two 
key objectives the designers of the Federal Reserve Act 
had envisioned: a system with universal participation 
and with par collection. 
The Voluntary Plan: 1915 
The Federal Reserve System's first efforts to implement 
a check collection system began in mid-1915. This was 
a voluntary plan for check clearing within (but not 
between) Federal Reserve Districts. Participating mem-
bers, who agreed to pay their own checks at par, could 
send checks drawn on other district participants to their 
local Fed. Once there, checks would be immediately 
credited to the reserve accounts of the sending banks 
and immediately debited or charged to the accounts of 
the members on which the checks were drawn. 
Within a year the plan was judged a failure, largely 
due to the Fed's inability to attract enough member 
banks: fewer than 25 percent of the existing members 
joined the plan. Their reasons for not joining were 
various. Some refrained because they wanted to con-
tinue charging remittance fees. Others preferred to 
retain their city correspondents. Still others refused to 
join because the number of nonparticipating members 
and nonmembers was high enough to make participa-
tion ineffective. 
As a result of the plan's failure, the Fed's Board 
concluded that the system needed to involve more 
members. They also decided that immediately crediting 
and debiting accounts was impractical: too often im-
mediate debiting reduced or overdrew a member's 
reserve account, forcing the Fed to extend credit to 
cover the deficit or the member banks to anticipate 
overdrafts by keeping excess reserves. 
The Broader Plan: 1916 
In mid-1916, the Board initiated a more comprehensive 
plan for check clearing. The plan had the following 
features: First, Fed Banks would receive at par from 
members those checks drawn on other members, wher-
ever located, and checks drawn on nonmember banks 
when such checks could be collected at par. Second, 
member banks were required to pay all checks at par. 
This second feature was not a voluntary matter: par 
remittance was mandatory. Third, rather than imme-
diately crediting and debiting checks received, Fed 
Banks would employ an alternative accounting system 
of deferred crediting and debiting; that is, they would 
credit the accounts of the sending members at approxi-
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mately the same time that the banks on which the 
checks were drawn could receive and acknowledge 
them. It was believed this procedure would minimize 
the likelihood of a member's reserve account being 
overdrawn as well as the amount of Fed float (checks in 
process of collection) generated by overdrafts. And 
finally, the Board would settle any indebtedness among 
Fed Banks arising from the handling of checks on a 
national rather than strictly regional basis. This would 
be accomplished by book entries in the Gold Settlement 
Fund, a fund located in Washington, D.C., into which 
Fed Banks had made gold deposits. Settling debts by 
book entry would reduce to a minimum any need to ship 
currency between Fed Banks. 
In announcing this plan, the Board stated that while it 
was not possible at the time for Fed Banks to collect all 
checks on nonmember banks at par, steps would be 
taken as quickly as possible to achieve this result, an 
objective later termed universal par collection. By being 
able to collect all nonmember checks at par, Fed Banks 
would be able to serve members more adequately, and 
members would send all their check collection business 
directly to the Fed.
7 With full participation, the Fed 
would become a complete and more efficient members' 
clearing system in which all their out-of-town checks 
could be exchanged. It would still, however, fall short 
of a complete national clearing system, since non-
members were not entitled to send their checks to the 
Fed for collection. 
The immediate response to the plan was positive. By 
mid-August 1916, nearly 15,000 banks had agreed to 
remit at par those checks sent by the Fed for payment. 
Of these banks, about half were members required to 
pay par and half nonmembers who had joined voluntar-
ily. However, over 13,000 nonmember banks still had 
not agreed to pay par. Moreover, many members con-
tinued to send all or a substantial portion of their check 
collection business to city correspondents rather than 
the Fed. 
These shortcomings were a challenge to the Fed. To 
attract greater participation by members, the Board 
authorized Fed Banks to extend collection services to 
noncash items, such as maturing notes, bankers' accep-
tances, and other types of bills. To get nonmembers to 
pay their checks at par, the Board counted on competi-
tive forces:" As any bank will be likely to lose desirable 
business when checks drawn upon it are at a discount, 
while checks drawn on a nearby competitor circulate at 
par, it is believed that in the near future checks upon 
practically all banks in the United States can be col-
lected at par by Federal Reserve Banks" (FR Board 
1917, p. 10). The logic behind this conviction was 
roughly this: (1) banks would charge their customers 
extra for the service of accepting and collecting checks 
drawn on nonpar banks; (2) bank customers would 
react by refusing to accept checks drawn on nonpar 
banks or by complaining to check writers about nonpar 
checks; and (3) check writers, in turn, would shift their 
accounts from nonpar to par banks. 
Wishing to encourage the forces of competition and 
to expand the coverage of the Fed clearing system, the 
Board proposed an amendment (passed in 1917) to the 
Federal Reserve Act that would permit nonmembers to 
send their checks directly to the Fed for collection. The 
condition for gaining access to the Fed system was that 
nonmembers pay their checks at par and hold modest 
clearing accounts at Fed Banks. This last requirement 
was a burden that the Board believed could be more 
than offset if joining nonmembers closed the many 
correspondent balances they maintained for collection 
purposes and then placed the proceeds in local loans. In 
proposing this amendment, the Board opened up the 
prospect that the Fed would become a true national 
clearinghouse, one in which all banks exchanged their 
checks. 
Progress toward this goal, however, was much 
slower than Fed officials expected. Members still 
depended on city correspondents to handle their 
checks. As for nonmembers, nearly 11,000 were still 
nonpar in mid-1918. Fed clearing accounts had almost 
no attraction for these nonpar banks, and competitive 
forces seemed to be ignoring the Board's reasoning: 
Some banks didn't charge their customers for deposit-
ing nonpar checks. Customers who were charged must 
not have complained to the nonpar banks' check 
writers—the cost of doing so may not have been worth 
the effort. And even if customers had complained, the 
writers of nonpar checks may not always have had an 
accessible par bank to which to shift accounts. 
The Coercive Plan: 1918 
In 1918, Fed officials decided to get tough. To encour-
age more widespread participation by member banks, 
they eliminated the Fed's check-handling service 
charge that had been imposed at the start of the 1916 
plan and similarly eliminated most other Fed charges. 
The Federal Reserve Act specified a three-year period for the transition 
from the old reserve system, in which balances at reserve city banks served as 
reserves, to the new system, in which only balances at Fed Banks could serve 
that purpose. November 1917 marked the end of the transition period, and the 
Board believed that at this time members would have an additional incentive for 
sending their checks to the Fed. 
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par collection, Fed Banks began to accept all checks, 
even those drawn on nonpar banks that would not agree 
to remit at par. But the Fed, by law, could not pay 
remittance charges. To skirt these charges, the Fed took 
advantage of the standard practice that checks pres-
ented in person at a bank had to be paid out at par. In 
doing so, however, the Fed Banks incurred other 
expenses, namely, hiring agents or sending out their 
own employees to present checks directly to nonpar 
banks. 
The Fed's more aggressive approach produced re-
sults: many more banks agreed to pay their checks at 
par. By the mid-1920s, only 2,300 nonmember banks 
continued nonpar payment. However, this tougher approach 
incited the opposition of a number of country banks. 
They successfully lobbied for state laws favoring non-
par practices and took the Fed to court as well. In 
several cases, court decisions restricted the Fed's use of 
agents to make over-the-counter presentation of checks, 
ruling that the Fed couldn't present checks in a manner 
designed to oppress or coerce by accumulating an 
unusually large number of checks to present or by 
indulging in practices inconsistent with customary 
bank methods (Spahr 1926, p. 288). In 1923, the 
Supreme Court ruled that state laws protecting nonpar 
practices were constitutional. The Court pointed out 
that the language of the Federal Reserve Act didn't 
actually require the Fed to accept all checks for collec-
tion, nor did it require the Fed to establish a universal 
par collection system. The Board had only interpreted 
the act's language in this way. 
The Abandonment of Par: 1923 
Shortly after the Court's decision, the Board formally 
abandoned its drive for universal par collection. It 
directed Fed Banks to discontinue the use of express 
companies and other nonbank agents to make over-
the-counter presentations at nonpar banks. It also ruled 
that Fed Banks could no longer accept and collect 
checks drawn on nonpar banks. Instead, such checks 
would have to be handled through the correspondent 
system. With these changes, nonpar banking began a 
gradual comeback. At the end of 1923, there were 
nearly 3,000 nonpar banks, representing about 10 per-
cent of all commercial banks and holding less than 
3 percent of commercial bank assets. And by the close 
of 1928, their number had increased to nearly 4,000, 
representing 15 percent of all commercial banks and 
less than 4 percent of total assets. 
The Fed's other goal, that of becoming the nation's 
clearinghouse with participation by all banks, was also 
fading from view. At the end of 1923, only about 
1 percent of 19,600 nonmember banks sent their 
checks directly to the Fed for collection; instead, the 
checks were sent to city correspondents. Among mem-
bers, participation was higher but still disappointing. A 
1923 sample survey found that members located out-
side cities with Federal Reserve Banks and branches 
sent an average of only 16 percent of their out-of-town 
checks directly to the Fed for collection (Demmery 
1924, pp. 292-94). The rest went to city correspond-
ents, most of whom were member banks who made 
heavier use of Fed facilities, sending in for collection a 
portion of both their own checks and those received 
from member and nonmember country banks. Although 
this rerouting of checks boosted total Fed check 
volume, it represented a form of circuitous routing—a 
problem that was supposed to be eliminated by the 
Fed's check collection system. 
So by the end of 1923, the Federal Reserve's system 
for out-of-town check collection had failed to take over 
the field, though it attained an important position. City 
banks had competed vigorously with the Fed to retain 
their correspondent relationships, a type of business 
that had proved profitable to them in the past. In return 
for keeping country banks' balances, city banks offered 
country banks an extensive line of services, ranging 
from investment advice and the management of surplus 
funds to the collection of foreign drafts. Some of these 
services were supplied without explicit charge, others 
for a fee. In contrast, Fed Banks did not offer as exten-
sive a list of services and, on comparable types of 
services, could not offer terms as favorable as city 
correspondents. For example, city banks continued to 
give immediate rather than deferred credit on checks 
sent to them for collection by country banks, and they 
did not require checks to be presorted, as did the Fed. As 
a result of city banks' ability to out-compete the Fed, 
the check payments system became, and still remains, a 
dual system—part Fed, part correspondent banking 
networks. 
Conclusion 
From our investigation of how the government became 
involved in the check payments system, we conclude 
that the government's visible hand was warranted. 
Although the banking industry had recognized the 
problems of the correspondent system for intercom-
munity check collection and had attempted its reform, 
remedies to the problems would have involved losses to 
some banks and gains to others. As such, conflicting 
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interests within the banking community made a timely 
private-sector solution unlikely. When the government 
initiated its banking reform measures after the Panic of 
1907, reform of the payments system was an appro-
priate part of that initiative. 
The framers of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 had 
two key objectives for the ideal national check pay-
ments system they envisioned: First, the collections sys-
tem should be universal—that is, one in which all banks 
in the nation would participate. Second, the system 
would require par payment—that is, payment would be 
remitted for a check's full face value. 
Attaining these key objectives turned out to be far 
more difficult than hoped. Neither a universal system 
nor par payment was achieved. The Fed did, however, 
enjoy some success in improving the efficiency of inter-
community check collection. Its new system extended 
the clearinghouse technology to a national level and 
made the personal check a more acceptable means of 
payment. The settlement of member banks' clearing 
balances by bookkeeping entry, rather than bank draft 
or currency, was certainly more efficient than the cor-
respondent system. And although the Fed could not 
eliminate nonpar payment practices, it reduced the 
number of nonpar banks and probably helped limit 
abuses in their remittance charge practices. 
So despite its partial success in attaining its framers' 
two key objectives, the Fed should still be credited (at 
par) for initiating a national clearing system. The 
government's visible hand in the check payments sys-
tem provided the necessary impetus for achieving this 
milestone in the evolution of the payments system. 
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